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Health Care Prices, The Federal Budget, And Economic Growth by Ralph M. Monaco and John H. Phelps Abstract: Rising health care spending, led by rising prices, has had an enormous impact on the economy, especially on the federal budget. Our work shows that if rapid growth in health care prices continues, under current institutional arrangements, real economic growth and employment will be lower during the next two decades than if health price inflation were somehow reduced. How big the losses are and which sectors bear the brunt of the costs vary depending on how society chooses to fund the federal budget deficit that stems from the rising cost of federal health care programs.
I
n their quest to balance the federal budget, more and more analysts are recognizing that health care spending trends greatly affect the rest of the economy-especially, but not exclusively, by affecting the federal budget. Policymakers who patch up the federal budget without addressing health care spending are in for a rude surprise, since rising health care spending likely will eat away at progress toward reducing the deficit.
Elsewhere in this volume, Mark Pauly takes a preliminary look at the interaction between the health care sector and the rest of the economy. Although he notes possible economic impacts from changing real health care spending, he dismisses the effects of changing medical inflation. We believe that Pauly's analysis may be correct in a given set of circumstances, but we suggest that the current institutional arrangements for providing and financing health care allow for significant economic effects from changing medical care prices. This DataWatch illustrates our empirical results and shows how the institutional arrangements allow for the possibility of significant economic impacts from changing health care inflation on other sectors of the economy.
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Background on empirical work. For the past few years we have been engaged in research that aims to (1) identify how the health sector is linked to the rest of the economy, and (2) measure the quantitative importance of those links. We have used an interindustry macroeconomic model of the U.S. economy that projects information such as output, jobs, productivity, and prices for each of eighty-five producing sectors. Costs, such as wages, D ATAWATCH 2 49 benefits (including health insurance contributions), depreciation, and profits, are projected for fifty-one industries. Macroeconomic interactions among variables such as inflation, interest rates, exchange rates, and the unemployment rate are allowed, as well as direct and indirect reactions among industry-specific employment, income, and prices. We use this model because it is rich enough to capture many of the second-round effects missed by partial analyses, and because it focuses on the long term (through the year 2010)-a perspective useful for policy planning.
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Along with other possibilities, we analyzed the effects of higher health care prices, holding constant any change in inflation-adjusted consumer health care spending. Our results show that, in contrast with Pauly's conclusion, there are economic costs associated with rapid health care inflation. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth and economywide employment are lower. Inflation is higher. A key result is that the effects on interest rates and how the economic losses are distributed across industries depend on how federal spending on health care is financed. If federal spending is deficit-financed, costs are disproportionately borne by capital goods and export industries. If spending is financed through payroll taxes, consumer service industries are hurt most. Although these results are conceptually straightforward, our work adds a quantitative dimension to the analysis.
Identifying The Channels
If the market for medical care worked well, and without interference from governments, rising prices would signify a freely chosen change in demand for medical services relative to their supply. A demand increase that raises prices (and possibly output) simply transfers income from consumers who demand medical care to other consumers (who are also incidentally medical care suppliers or medical service corporation stockholders). Because price movements reflect demand and supply changes, it is hard to argue that aggregate consumer welfare has changed at all, despite the possibility of significant redistributive or macroeconomic impacts.
However, for a host of reasons, public policy has brought government into the medical care market, making the redistributive and macroeconomic consequences dependent on public policy decisions. The current Medicare program, for example, subsidizes health care for the elderly by taxing workers. Rapid increases in Medicare outlays threaten the solvency of the Medicare trust fund and point to looming federal deficits. Deficits transfer the financing costs to future generations of workers through higher debt service payments. Medicare itself has contributed to rising demand for medical care services. In fact, this is what the program is designed to do: raise consumption of medical services by the elderly. At the time of the program's inception, the public policy problem was that the elderly were, from society's perspective, "underconsuming" medical care.
Other institutional arrangements foster rising demand or restricted supply and, consequently, rising prices. For example, the prevalence of private third-party payers severs the link between service and cost, which usually disciplines the market. The laundry list of imperfections in the medical care marketplace is long and familiar, but most analysts agree that these imperfections have allowed medical care prices to grow more quickly than the general price level. 3 The rising relative price of health care has affected the economy through various channels, especially through the federal budget.
Quite simply, high health care spending, spurred by price inflation, has devastated the federal budget. Federal spending on Medicare and Medicaid rose nearly fourfold between 1980 and 1993, increasing the share of federal outlays going to these programs from 8.1 percent to 15.2 percent. Adjusting for general inflation, not specific medical inflation, federal spending per person in the United States on these two programs rose more than 6 percent each-year. The comparison with nonhealth programs is stark. Excluding Medicare, Medicaid, and interest payments, inflation-adjusted Along with raising federal outlays directly, high health care inflation reduces federal revenue. Most economists believe that labor compensation grows along with the average price level and labor productivity, When health prices rise faster than other prices, and this is not offset by increasing labor productivity, employers' contributions for health insurance rise as a share of overall compensation. In other words, wages and salaries shrink as a share of labor's total compensation package. The important point for the federal budget is that contributions for health insurance are not taxable. Thus, high health care price inflation reduces the tax base. High health care inflation traps the federal government between rising outlays and slackening revenues and makes it extremely difficult to balance the budget.
The last point is worth emphasizing. Balancing the federal budget requires much more stringent spending cuts when medical care prices are rising faster than the general price level. This is because federal spending rises directly with medical care prices, and because federal revenues fall as medical care prices rise. To the extent that health care spending has increased past deficits, current interest payments to service higher debt required to balance their operating budgets, the upward pressure on outlays from health programs leads to either tax increases or reductions in other state and local outlays.
High health care inflation affects the private economy in several ways. One direct effect is on the incomes of health care-sector workers and proprietors who have benefited from the rising relative price of medical care. Between 1980 and 1992, for example, real wages and salaries (including proprietor income) per hour in the medical services industry grew $3.20 per hour, almost three times the increase for all workers and proprietors in the general economy.
For persons not drawing income from the health care sector, rapid health care price growth keeps overall inflation up and lowers real incomes. Second-round effects begin to mount. Higher inflation raises nominal interest rates, and deficit-financed Medicare and Medicaid spending raises real interest rates. Rising real interest rates reduce consumer spending on durable goods, housing activity, and business investment and raise the exchange value of the dollar. A rising dollar makes it difficult for exporters to compete with foreign goods and encourages imports. Overall, then, higher interest rates resulting from rapidly rising health care prices tend to reduce real growth and the number of jobs in the economy.
How Big Are These Effects?
We used our model to estimate the effects of changing health care inflation on the economy-both as a whole and for individual industries. To start our analyses, we set health care prices to rise at the rate of overall inflation-about 3.1 percent a year for the next seventeen years. We call this the "low spending" scenario. Our second simulation raised health care prices slightly more than 2.7 percentage points above the general inflation rate for each year of the simulation. The difference between medical inflation and the general inflation rate matches the 1980-1994 experience and is largely consistent with Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) assumptions about health care price growth over the next several years. 4 We call this the "business-asusual" scenario. In the low spending case the share of consumer health spending of nominal gross national product (GNP) rises from 11.2 percent in 1994 to 11.9 percent in 2010. In our higher spending case the share of medical consumer spending of nominal GNP is 18.9 percent in 2010.
When we simulated the model with high medical care inflation, one result was large federal deficits relative to the low spending scenario. This led us to consider a "pay-as-you-go" scenario, which forces current-year taxpayers to finance the additional spending resulting from the higher 5 In Exhibits 1 through 5 we report how higher health care price inflation affects the several economic indicators in 2010 with and without pay-as-you-go financing.
Business-As-Usual With Deficit Financing
We found that high health care inflation hurts the economy substantially in the longer run, even when taxpayers are not forced to pay directly for high government health spending. Real GDP is 1 percent lower in 2010. The total number of jobs in the economy is about one-half percent lower; about 750,000 fewer jobs in 2010. Inflation is higher. The federal deficit as a percentage of GDP rises by more than three percentage points relative to the base in the business-as-usual scenario. Relative to the low price base, higher inflation and federal deficits drive up interest rates, further raising federal borrowing requirements. The results tend to cumulate; small reductions in jobs and GDP in the early years of the simulation give way to progressively larger reductions as the simulation horizon lengthens.
Higher interest rates affect groups in the economy differently. For net debtors higher interest rates raise financing costs. Chief among the net debtors is the federal government. Overall, higher interest costs reduce spending on residential buildings and business structures and equipment. Higher real interest rates-up about 0.5 percentage points in 2010-reduce real merchandise exports 1.5 percent. While overall employment is down 0.5 percent, foreign trade-sensitive industries and construction are hit disproportionately (Exhibit 5). Relative to the low spending case, employ-
Exhibit 2 Percentage Differences From Low Spending Base For Selected Variables In 2010
Real GDP Real consumer spending, total Real merchandise exports ment is 1.8 percent lower in durables manufacturing and 1.9 percent lower in construction, both of which were hit more than three times as hard as the overall economy. While higher interest rates tend to reduce activity in some sectors of the economy, they promote activity in others. This is because the higher 2010 with high health care price inflation, partially because medical transfers are up and because interest income is up, mainly from the federal government (Exhibit 2). As a result, jobs in wholesale and retail trade decline by a smaller percentage than the economywide average, and there are actually slightly more jobs in nonmedical service industries-such as movies, restaurants, and business services (Exhibit 5).
The uneven industrial impacts of high health spending extend to more than jobs. Exhibit 3 shows that employer health insurance costs as a share of labor compensation rise substantially under business-as-usual. For example, in durables manufacturing health insurance costs reach 17.5 percent of the labor compensation bill in 2010 under business-as-usual-an increase of 7.2 percentage points over the low spending case.
6 Real wages and salaries by industry are reduced as the share of health insurance contributions rises (Exhibit 4). Real wages and salaries are higher only in the medical services sector. In real terms, while the average of all industries is down by $1.50 per hour, real wages and salaries are up $15 per hour in the medical services sector. This disparity reflects a 55 percent increase in the relative price of medical services as well as our simplifying assumption that real consumer medical spending is not different across simulations.
By changing the relative importance of sources of income, high health care inflation has implications for the distribution of income, the effects of which, unfortunately, are not yet captured in the model. However, it is still useful to point out that the federal health benefits go almost entirely to the elderly. High health care prices raise income directly only in the health care sector. And interest receipts are captured largely by the upper 40 percent of income recipients, who own government debt. Shifting income to the elderly and wealthy will change the demands facing individual industries and may make the distribution of income more unequal over time.
To sum up, business-as-usual leads to higher inflation and interest rates, less economic growth, and fewer jobs. It also tends to skew economic activity away from investment and exports toward consumer spending that is not sensitive to higher interest rates, like services. The trade deficit rises. Many of these effects are transmitted through rising federal deficits, pushed up by rising health care outlays and a shrinking tax base. The effects of rising deficits and interest rates are self-reinforcing. Higher deficits raise the amount of federal debt outstanding, which is the base on which federal interest payments are made. Higher interest rates raise servicing costs for each dollar of the federal debt. Larger interest payments raise the deficit in subsequent years, making future deficits even more difficult to reduce. For example, in 2010 only $355 billion of the deficit is higher because of medical spending; the other $206 billion deficit increase is attributable to second-round effects of higher interest payments and a reduced wage and D ATAWATCH 2 57 salary tax base (see Exhibit 1). In 2010, with high health inflation, the federal debt held by the public is 145 percent of the low spending case.
Pay-As-You-Go Financing
What happens when we do not allow high health care price inflation to increase the federal deficit? To investigate this, we raised payroll taxes in our model so that the federal deficit with high health care inflation matches the low spending deficit. 7 We found that we had to raise the personal contribution rate by three full percentage points to offset the effects of high health care prices on the solvency of the social insurance fund. This is actually a six-percentage-point increase, since employer contributions also rise by three percentage points. Smaller increases are required in the early years of the simulation.
Pay-as-you-go financing changes some of the results dramatically, while making only minor differences to others. Real GDP losses are slightly worse with higher taxes than without, while job losses are substantially greater. Interest rates are significantly lower when pay-as-you-go financing is used, mainly because federal credit demands are lessened. The combination of lower levels of federal interest payments to consumers and higher taxes lowers real disposable consumer income substantially, in contrast to the business-as-usual case. Compared with low spending, real consumer spending is down nearly 3 percent with pay-as-you go financing.
Higher taxes and lower interest rates change the industrial composition of real activity. As already noted, consumer spending is much lower in payas-you-go. Real merchandise exports, however, are 2.5 percent higher. While the number of jobs in the economy is down 1 percent in 2010, the number of construction jobs is down 0.9 percent and jobs in durables manufacturing are up 1.1 percent. Job losses are proportionately greater in most service industries, like wholesale and retail trade (down 2.2 percent) and nonmedical services (down 1.2 percent).
Summary And Conclusions
Several implications stand out. First, health care cost containment, to the extent that it is synonymous with lower health care price inflation, can greatly reduce the federal deficit and increase real economic growth, even in the absence of other policies. If health insurance reform, or health care reform of another sort, did not decrease health care quality but succeeded in slowing price inflation, our work suggests that we would have a stronger overall economy. As a rule? health care analysts point to inefficiencies in the provision of health care as a potential source of cost/ price containment. Second, analyses of health care reform generally have ignored both the long-term effects reform can have and the way the health care sector interacts with the rest of the economy. We think that these analyses are seriously incomplete. The issues here are similar to those raised in the current discussions of static versus dynamic scoring of tax law changes. By focusing only on the next few years, analysts miss the longer-term costs associated with rapid health care inflation. Our effects took several years to manifest themselves. By ignoring the ways that rising health care prices hurt other industries and the economy in general, analysts underestimate the potential benefits of reducing health care cost growth.
In many respects, our analysis and findings are not controversial. Reasonable analysts may disagree about whether the GDP effects through 2010 are large enough to merit concern. We note that our effects cumulate; simulating the model further into the future would create larger GDP and total employment effects. Even through 2010, however, our work shows that changes in capital spending and exports alter the structure of industry output and employment, which has public policy and political implications. Further, the implications of our findings for the current debate about how best to reduce the federal deficit are important. Federal, state, and local budgets are exposed to the vagaries of health care inflation through the current medical care entitlement programs. Thus, a major part of the United States's seemingly endless budget difficulties is accounted for by rapid health care inflation. Balanced budget rules and policies ignoring that reality will not ultimately help the U.S. economy and, in the long run, likely will cause more harm than good. m Conceptually, the losses in real economic activity in any year can be smaller when part of the costs can be pushed into the indefinite future, that is, when the federal deficit is allowed to increase substantially. But this is partly an illusion. Higher deficits allow some of the costs to be pushed onto future generations. Because the simulation stops after 2010, these costs are pushed out beyond the simulation horizon. Logically, however, the deficits associated with high health care inflation cannot rise indefinitely, unless those deficits somehow raise productivity. Higher taxes in the future, beyond the simulation horizon, would lower real GDP and employment in those years, too, but those effects are not accounted for in the business-as-usual simulation alone. We assumed that insurance contributions per worker grow at the rate of consumer health spending per worker in all industries. This is a simplifying assumption. Allowing industries' per worker contributions to grow at different rates introduces further intersectoral changes, which, although interesting, are not the focus of this paper. As Exhibit 1 shows, the low spending and pay-as-you-go deficits are only approximately equal. We chose to increase payroll taxes for two major reasons. First, it was a simple alternative as an illustration. More complicated spending reductions and/ or tax increase schemes could have been tried but are harder to justify without reference to a specific legislative proposal. Thus, we started with a simple payroll tax increase. Second, payroll taxes largely fund Medicare. High medical price inflation reduces the solvency of the Medicare trust fund. Rather than tracking solvency of individual social insurance funds, the model tracks the solvency of all federal social insurance funds combined. In 2010 the overall solvency ratio was 70 percent lower with higher health care inflation. Pay-as-you-go financing retains the base level of solvency in the overall social insurance trust fund.
